TL;DR Intents can control application logic Client-side state machines are exploitable adb is a valid attacker tool Context This note documents abusing Intent-driven state machines in ...
TL;DR Every UI screen maps to an Activity Exported components expand the attack surface Intents are a primary entry point for untrusted input Threat Model Context From a penetration te...
TL;DR Obfuscation does not protect client-side secrets Backend APIs and keys are often easy to extract Effective Android pentesting is about focus, not full code understanding Context ...
TL;DR APKs must be aligned and signed before installation apktool extracts resources and smali jadx provides near-source Java decompilation Client-side code is fully exposed Context ...
TL;DR ADB is the primary bridge between analyst and device Many Android attacks require ADB interaction File access, app management, logging, and activity triggering are possible Understa...
TL;DR Intents are Android’s inter-process communication (IPC) mechanism Exported activities act as external entry points Incoming intent data is fully attacker-controlled Most Android log...
Summary Today I learned that finding a vulnerability is rarely the end of the story. Real-world impact usually comes from: Bypassing security controls Combining multiple weaknesses together ...
Summary Today I practiced Injection vulnerabilities and Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in APIs. Using fuzzing techniques and multiple tools, I learned how improper input handling can allow att...
Summary Today I practiced two high-impact API vulnerabilities that frequently lead to account takeover and business logic abuse: Improper Assets Management Mass Assignment Both issues often...
Summary Today I practiced two of the most critical API authorization vulnerabilities: Broken Object Level Authorization (BOLA) Broken Function Level Authorization (BFLA) These issues are si...